Translated from Arabic by Farnaz Perry 

When discussing the political assassinations that unfolded in the aftermath of the 2021 Iraqi elections, it is crucial to note that there are no official statistics confirming the exact number of killings. This has been asserted by official sources in the government. The documentation efforts in the departments under the direction of the Ministry of Interior have aimed to shield these statistics from public and media attention, closing any potential loopholes for information leaks. 

While researching this article, it was found that the Iraqi authorities resist any attempt to collect statistics on politicians, diplomats, journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens affected by crimes that fall under the category of political assassinations.

For its part, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Iraq has confirmed that there is a profoundly dark era in the country’s recent history in terms of the archiving and documentation practices that preceded the October protests (2003-2019). Although an official institution, the OHCHR is not able to provide accurate statistics on political assassinations. With the outbreak of the protests in October 2019, many organizations, including the OHCHR, have taken the courage to document violations in other ways. 

The statistics included in this paper, therefore, have been compiled from publicly available sources referenced in reliable press reports. However, the assassinations committed during and after the October 2019 protests have been documented through personal efforts. Some of these are discussed in this paper.

Commencing in early October 2019, the protests faced systematic, coordinated, and overt political elimination campaigns. More than ninety activists and demonstrators who had taken part in the protests were targeted, with a third of them losing their lives as a result of these attacks.

On the evening of October 3, 2019, armed men broke into the home of civil rights activist and cartoonist Hussein Adel and his wife Sarah Talib in Basra and murdered them in front of their young daughter. They were only killed because they helped wounded demonstrators. A year later, also in Basra, two gunmen murdered a child named Mujtaba al-Skeini, who was nicknamed Zajil ^[1]. The slender child, who came from a modest family, was killed at night for taking part in demonstrations that criticized corruption in political parties and demanded a better life for Iraqis.

These activists, along with others, were killed on grounds that they had participated in protests advocating for the slogan «We Want a Homeland». Their known killers are still at large. They are not being pursued by state agencies, who have concealed their identities and called them the «third party».

The first person to be assassinated by this «third party» was Hisham al-Hashimi, an academic researcher who was one of the leading experts on militant groups in Iraq and had written important texts on groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Al-Hashemi was killed on the evening of July 6, 2020, on his way home from work, a few months after he began advising Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi directly.

Visual activist Riham Yaqoub was targeted immediately after the assassination of al-Hashemi, despite her decision to stop participating in demonstrations following threats in 2018. She had devoted herself to her academic studies, her work and her specialization in sports, but could not protect herself from being killed on August 19, 2020. 

Five days before Yaqoub’s assassination, gunmen killed the prominent protest activist Osama Tahseen al-Shahmani in Basra on August 14, 2020. He was shot with 21 bullets that hit his body while he was at his workplace in the city center. 

The list of assassinations that were committed during the October protests also includes civil activist Jannat Mathi, who was killed on January 22, 2020. Thaer al-Tayeb was murdered on December 25, 2019, and activists Abdul Quddus Qasim and Karrar Adel were both killed on March 10, 2020. The list additionally includes Amjad al-Dahamat, Fahim al-Taie, Hasan Hadi, Salah al-Iraqi, Muhannad al-Qaisi, Alaa Bashi, Adnan Rostam, Ihab al-Wazni and lastly Haider al-Zamili. They were all activists who were murdered because of their participation in the protests. Most of their murderers are still at large. They are not being prosecuted by the state authorities and their identities are not being disclosed in Iraq.

Below is a table with statistics on assassinations and attempted assassinations of activists and media workers reported by the OHCHR in Iraq, documented by the author: 

In an effort to identify the «third party», Iraqi activists and legal experts published a database of the killings on May 24, 2021 (see below). This initiative was driven by individuals aiming to pressure the Iraqi parliament to investigate senior security forces and high-ranking officers responsible for public security. 

The planned interrogations were scheduled for June 2021, with the participation of social and religious elites as well as the families of the victims. The aim was to catalyze a movement both among the population and in parliament. The movement’s parliamentary coordination group, which describes itself as a supporter of the popular movement, endeavored to unveil what Twitterers and political activists call «Ali Baba’s Cave», a file documenting political crimes in Iraq post-2019. However, as of now, no significant breakthrough has been realized, and the file remains closed. 

Documented cases of political assassinations, assassinations attempt, and related-explosions of activists and intellectuals in Iraq, published by activists to be submitted to the Iraqi Parliament.

News of the failed terrorist attack in Iraq on November 7, 2021, reverberated around the world when the residence of Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi in the Baghdad district of Al-Khadra was attacked by three explosives-laden drones.

The planner and executor of the operation did not claim responsibility for the attack; however, the incident resulted in material damage to the prime minister’s house. Iraqi security forces successfully intercepted and shot down two of the three drones. Six members of the Prime Minister’s bodyguard were also injured in the attack.

A day after the incident, security officials and sources close to armed groups in Iraq revealed that an Iranian-backed group was involved in the attack. The sources told Reuters that the drones and explosives used were of Iranian origin and emphasized that the identity of this group must be kept secret.

The assassination attempt conveyed a clear political message: the need to respond to the armed groups’ demands for greater representation in the House of Representatives following their electoral defeat. The context of this incident was the discussions about forming a government with a national majority, which had sidelined these groups and forced them into opposition. The election commission’s tough stance and the reluctance of the winning political blocs to accommodate them exacerbated the frustration of these groups and prompted them to escalate their actions.

In his victory speech on the evening of October 11, 2021, Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Sadrist movement, called on rival Shia armed groups to lay down their arms and join the government. Despite also leading the Peace Brigades armed faction, al-Sadr strongly emphasized the need to prohibit the use of weapons outside the jurisdiction of the state, stressing that it is time to allow people to live without militia interference. This was a clear signal to the armed groups in Iraq who claim to be part of the resistance axis led by Iran.

Shortly after this speech, two members of the «Asaib Ahl al-Haq» and the «Badr» organization, allied with the former, were murdered. Subsequently, a member of «Asaib Ahl al-Haq», Hussein al-Khafaji, and the first aide to the leader of the «Al-Fatah» alliance, Hamid al-Mahlawi, were found dead in Baghdad. The killing of Major General Salman Ghadban al-Shahwani on the same day was considered collateral damage.

Notably, the Coordination Framework had rejected the election results from the outset. Despite that, the expected chaos failed to materialize after the Federal Supreme Court declared the results valid on December 27, 2021. Instead, the wave of assassinations came to the fore again. On January 7, 2022, Ahmed Abdul Mutallab Abdul Razzaq, a member of the Iraqi «Kataib Hizbullah», and his family were killed in an attack on his residence in Baghdad. Hours later, Alaa Yasser Ramadan of the «Badr» organization was fatally shot while asleep in his home in the northern suburb of Kirkuk. Two days later, on the morning of the opening session of the new parliament, the body of Musallam al-Kaabi, the commander of the Peace Brigades, was discovered shot dead in Maysan province.

In early 2022, a wave of assassinations began in the southern provinces of Iraq, particularly in the province of Maysan, which is known to be part of the Sadrist movement’s sphere of influence. Armed groups such as the «Asaib Ahl al-Haq» under the leadership of Qais al-Khazali emerged in the province. These factions, which originally broke away from the Sadrist movement, are now affiliated with Iran.

Perhaps the main problem is the constant tension and pent-up anger between the different factions in Maysan, which intensified after the results of the October elections and the events that followed. This chain of events began in early January 2022 with the assassination of Muslim Idan, a leader of the Sadrist movement, and the «Asaib Ahl al-Haq» was accused of committing this act. This was succeeded by the assassination of officer Husam al-Alyawi, who is believed to be linked to the same group blamed for the assassination of Muslim Idan. These events escalated tensions and chaos and led to the assassination of Karrar Abu Raghif and Judge Ahmad Faisal, both members of the movement.

During the first session of the new parliament, the body of one of the leaders of Peace Brigades, was found shot dead in the province of Maysan. This incident can be interpreted as a warning to the leader Muqtada al-Sadr not to cooperate with Muhammad al-Halbousi, the speaker of parliament, and Masoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

There has been a significant shortage of judges in Iraq, both in terms of their duties and their adherence to internationally recognized standards, which recommend an approximate ratio of seven judges per 100,000 inhabitants. Accordingly, Iraq should ideally have around 2,800 judges, in addition to the public prosecutors. However, the current situation shows that there are only about 1,600 judges and only one public prosecutor. Since 2003, Iraq has lost 74 judges, all of whom dealt with cases of corruption, terrorism and drug trafficking.

This reality has led to judges being at risk of assault by criminal gangs and the mafia and exposed to corruption and terrorism. The most recent attack on the Iraqi judiciary was the assassination of Judge Ahmad Faisal Khassaf Al-Saidi, a specialist in drug cases, in an armed attack in the city of Amara in Maysan province in southeastern Iraq, where he was killed by unknown assailants.

The repeated attacks on judges reflect the state’s poor response to armed groups, large gangs and the mafia, which benefit from a loophole in the prosecution of legal cases. These gangs also rely on their alliances with clans, which increases the threat to judges and security institutions.

From the beginning of 2022 until the formation of the Coordination Framework government, assassinations in Iraq continued intermittently. During this period, Iraqi military figures and soldiers fell victim to assassinations, although ISIS did not claim responsibility for these acts this time. On February 2, 2022, two soldiers were killed with an explosive device northwest of the Rawa district in Anbar province.

On October 7, 2022, shortly after former intelligence officer Hawkar Abdullah Rasul drove away from his residence in Erbil in a sports car, an explosion occurred in his vehicle, killing him and injuring four members of his family.

Less than a week later, the Kurdistan Security Council issued a statement announcing that its security squads arrested six suspects linked to a ten-member cell. The group was planning terrorist attacks under the direct leadership of Wahab Halabji, the counter-terrorism officer in Sulaymaniyah, and Karzan Muhammad Rashid, the intelligence officer in the same unit. The statement went on to say that the investigation has confirmed the explicit instructions of Wahab Halabji and his team in the Sulaymaniyah counter-terrorism unit to carry out the assassination of Hawkar Al-Jaff. 

A few days after the establishment of the Coordination Framework government under the leadership of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, an American citizen named Stephen Troell, who was working for an aid organization, was attacked in Baghdad on November 7, 2022. Assailants in Tahoe and Mercedes vehicles equipped with silenced weapons attacked him near the Karrada neighborhood in central Baghdad while he was traveling with his wife in a civilian car. The 45-year-old victim was transported to Sheikh Zayed Hospital by a security force but succumbed to his injuries there.

On August 31, 2023, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior issued judicial verdicts against five of those accused of killing the American citizen in Baghdad, including a defendant who holds Iranian nationality and works as a security adviser to the Iraqi security forces.

In February 2023, Ahmed Al-Madfai, a well-known heart surgery, was assassinated in the city of Baqubah in the province of Diyala, north-east of Baghdad. In a similar attack, a retired university professor named Abdul Rasoul al-Anbari was killed in the province of Babil, south of the capital.

On February 22, an Iraqi Air Force colonel pilot was assassinated in the Fallujah district in the western province of Anbar. This incident is the first of its kind in years.

These targeted killings follow a violent attack in which at least nine Iraqi citizens, including two women, were killed and others injured. The attack specifically targeted farmers working on their land in a village near the town of Khalis, northeast of Baqubah. Some political and parliamentary groups suggested that an armed militia was possibly behind the attack.

The marked increase in assassinations and kidnappings in Iraq, particularly in the predominantly Sunni province of Diyala, which borders Iran, raises many questions about the reasons for the return of this type of criminal activity to the fore after a period of relative stability in the region.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani issued a statement in a televised interview in which he emphasized that he would not tolerate a return of sectarian tensions in Diyala and that security authorities were working hard to identify those responsible for recent crimes in the province. He pointed out that he was personally following things but did not confront the Iraqi people with the reasons why this province has the highest rates of political killings in Iraq.

Iraqi MP Raad al-Dahlaki, who represents the province in parliament, explained that dollar smuggling gangs that used to use the security chaos in Diyala as a source of profit are coming under increasing pressure. These gangs have therefore resorted to destabilizing the region and increasing tensions in order to advance their interests.

After each wave of assassinations in Iraqi cities, the Ministry of Interior addresses the Iraqi population via newspapers, radio, social media, and television, claiming that the security situation in Iraqi cities remains generally stable and that the security forces are carefully monitoring the new incidents. Despite reports of a deteriorating security situation, the Ministry consistently denies such claims and emphasizes the intensive intelligence efforts to combat illegal activities and the ongoing investigations into assassinations. 

In its overall statements, the Ministry echoes what ordinary individuals, civil society organizations, political activists, and social advocates say. However, it does not take responsibility for any of these violations. In fact, it has granted in its latest decision of April 8, 2023 firearms licenses to additional groups. As outlined in the official statement, the decision included merchants holding first and second-class Chamber of Commerce cards, as well as first and second-degree contractors. It also included owners of goldsmith shops and gold stores and money exchange offices, on the condition that they use the ATM (Key Card) permit in accordance with current regulations and laws.

The Iraqi sectarian quota system has capitalized heavily on acts of terrorism committed on its land by portraying them as a constant threat that must be constantly combated. It has created a narrative that allows for the closure of cases that have nothing to do with terrorism, including grave human rights violations, assassinations that cannot be quantified, and ongoing forced displacement. Along the timeline, terrorism in Iraq has served as a convenient scapegoat for the problems of the political system and has played a significant role in many of its actions. This has allowed the regime to commit targeted killings and conveniently attribute them to terrorism, as has often happened in Iraq over the past eighteen years.

Strangely enough, the terrorist groups have begun to embrace the accusations leveled against them by successive governments. This is because they, i.e. the terrorist groups, see these accusations as an enhancement to their portfolio of violence, as it doubles their worth in the global terrorism market.

This trend is particularly evident in countries where the security environment has long been volatile, and governments often overstep the mark in the name of «fighting terrorism». The unwavering skepticism of journalists and activists who continue to challenge the official narrative has gradually shifted the focus to exposing the real perpetrators. If it weren’t for these waves of bold skepticism, all previous attacks would have been labeled by the government as «terrorism», a euphemism for «Sunni groups».

Political assassination is a historical phenomenon that is widespread throughout the world and varies in intensity and nature, with reactions differing from country to country. In some cases, a single assassination can topple governments and regimes. However, in other countries, such as Iraq after 2003, these crimes have few consequences, making it very easy for the perpetrators and planners to evade responsibility. In such cases, the perpetrators benefit from the protection of the political system and its security and judicial authorities, where political murders are almost official.

In Iraq, the authorities have persistently ignored the demands of the people and the pleas of the victims’ families to prosecute those responsible for the killings and bring them to justice. Instead of addressing these concerns, they selectively arrest people linked to Shia militias and release them at their own discretion. The authorities only approach these individuals once a militia’s attitude towards its supporters, who are made scapegoats, has been confirmed. 

This typically occurs when prisons are filled with members of Sunni terrorist groups, who are exploited as bargaining chips at different levels, with the financial gains from such transactions shrouded in uncertainty.

The families of those who have been politically targeted, as well as their colleagues, know who the real culprits are who orchestrated the murders of their loved ones. Despite their tireless efforts to petition the authorities for justice, including their persistent posts on social media demanding retribution, their pleas remain unanswered. 

The perpetrators, backed by missiles, drones and international intelligence agencies, hide behind their beards and turbans, as well as religious platforms and a vast network of satellite channels, radios, and newspapers, referring to the perpetrators as «unknown persons». The established system in Iraq has created an unprecedented environment that favors impunity and hinders the pursuit of justice.